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Abstract
Entangled states can be used as secure carriers of information much in the same way as carriers
are used in classical communications. In such protocols, quantum states are uploaded to the carrier
at one end and are downloaded from it in safe form at the other end, leaving the carrier intact and
ready for reuse. Furthermore, protocols have been designed for performing quantum state sharing
in this way. In this work, we study the robustness of these protocols against noise and show that
multiple uses of these carriers do not lead to accumulative errors, rather the error remains constant
and under control.
1 Introduction
Conventionally in quantum information processes [1, 2, 3, 4] entanglement is used as a resource which
is consumed at the end of a process and has to be renewed for a second use. This is the case for telepor-
tation, measurement-based quantum computation and many other protocols. For example in quantum
secret sharing schemes [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], which is the subject of interest in the present work, the
highly non-classical correlation in the shared entangled state allows the legitimate parties to establish
a random shared key between themselves. Of course there are also cryptographic protocols which are
sequential and do not use entanglement at all [11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
The idea of using an entangled state between two remote points, as a reusable carrier of informa-
tion, first came up in [19] and then extended to quantum secret sharing in [20] by one of the authors.
This idea is a natural generalization of the idea behind today’s classical communication networks,
in the sense that an entangled state between two or more points acts as a secure carrier of informa-
tion between these points. The sender entangles (uploads) a state to the carrier which is disentangled
(downloaded) by the receiver at the other end. The additional feature, due to the quantum properties
is that during transmission, the state is hidden from potential adversaries. The hiding effect is a di-
rect result of entanglement of the message state with the carrier state, by which the message state is
in a highly mixed state and carrying no information at all by itself. Only in the sender and receiver
ends, where the message is uploaded (entangled to the carrier) or downloaded (disentangled from the
carrier), the identity of the message is revealed. At the end of each round, the carrier returns to its
initial state and is ready for a second round of use. We stress that an entangled state is not used here
in the usual sense, i.e. to securely establish a shared random key between the parties[21], but to send
a deterministic message from one end to the other. In case of [19] the carrier is a simple Bell state
between two parties, while in case of [20], the carrier is a three party entangled state and alternates
between two specific forms in consecutive rounds. In this protocol Alice sends a classical or quantum
message to Bob and Charlie who can retrieve it only by their collaboration. Note that by classical
message we mean classical bits which have been encoded into computational states {|0〉, |1〉} and by
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quantum message we mean an unknown quantum state |φ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉.
We should stress that entanglement in this sense, that is, for sending deterministic messages, has
not been reported previously before the two references [19] and [20]. Of course the price of this higher
level protocol is the bigger resource that the players have to use, i.e. the multi-party entangled states
in the transition stage. These schemes may seem impractical with present technologies, however with
the intensive research on quantum networks, they may become potential candidates for the quantum
communication methods of tomorrow. Therefore it is important to study these schemes from different
points of view. In particular it is important to investigate how resilient these protocols are against
noise of the environment. Of particular importance are the de-phasing and depolarizing noise which
we study in this paper. We will examine in detail the scheme of [20] for Quantum State Sharing (QSS)
and determine how much error the de-phasing and depolarizing noise incur on the transmitted data
and states. It is important to determine how much error the noise of environment will incur on the
fidelity between the sent and the received q(bits). This will allow the legitimate players to distinguish
the noise resulting from the action of an adversary from the environmental noise and help them to
reveal the presence of an adversary. Note that our emphasis is on the concept of entangled state as
a reusable carrier of information and not on the security of such a protocol against various types of
attacks.
An important question is whether or not a noisy carrier, specially when it is continually under the
uploading, downloading and Hadamard actions of the players, will keep its shape or will be disrupted
after a few rounds and will be completely useless. We will show that this is not the case and the carrier
will keep its form and is only mixed by a well-known and controlled state. Here we will study the
case where the carrier has been contaminated by noise before the operations start and the time scale
of operations are fast enough that the additional noise during the operations is negligible.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section (2), we briefly review the protocols of [20] in
a self-contained way. The main point of the scheme of [20] is that the three parties involved in the
state sharing scheme, have to use two kinds of carriers in alternating rounds and these two carriers are
turned into each other by their local action at the end of each round. In sections (3) and section (4)
we study the effect of two important types of noise, namely de-phasing and depolarizing noise on this
protocol. Although we focus on the three-party case, the idea can be easily generalized to schemes
with more than three players. We end the paper with conclusion and outlook.
2 Entangled states as reusable carriers of information
Consider three parties, Alice (A), Bob (B) and Charlie (C). The goal of Alice is to send a state
|ψ〉 = a|0〉 + b|1〉 to Bob and Charlie so that they can retrieve it only if they collaborate with each
other. We assume that Bob and Charlie are at one location and can affect two qubit gates on the state
they receive. In the meantime Alice wants to keep this state from any possible adversaries by entan-
gling it with a carrier which is shared between her and the other two parties. In the end the carrier
should be such that it can be used again for sending other qubits. Before proceeding, it is better that we
collect all our notations and conventions and some basic facts and formulas which are easily proved
by direct calculations.
2
2.1 Notations and conventions
We use the subscripts A,B, and C for the qubits of carrier possessed by Alice, Bob and Charlie and
the subscripts 1 and 2 for the two qubits which are being communicated. The qubit 1 is always sent to
Bob and qubit 2 is always sent to Charlie. In equations and for the sake of simplicity, we write these
subscripts only on the left hand side. The same subscripts are to be understood for the states on the
right hand side.
Let q be a bit ∈ {0, 1}. q is meant to denote the negation of q, i.e. 0 = 1, 1 = 0. We define the state
|02〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), |12〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), (1)
to represent respectively the two qubit states of even and odd parity. In close form we write
|q〉 = 1√
2
(|0, q〉+ |1, q〉). (2)
Remark: Hereafter and most of the time, we write all states without normalization and assume
that they are understood to be properly normalized. Thus, a state like |000〉+|111〉 is to be understood
as 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉).
The even and odd parity states can be extended to more than two parties. For three qubits we have
|03〉 = |0〉|02〉+ |1〉|12〉,
|13〉 = |0〉|12〉+ |1〉|02〉. (3)
This can be extended to n parties in the same way by induction on n, although we do not need this
here. The subscripts A, B and C are used to denote qubits in possession of the three players conven-
tionally called Alice, Bob and Charlie. The subscripts 1 and 2 are used to denote the qubits which are
being transmitted, one to B and the other to C. We write these subscripts only on the left hand side
of equations, with the understanding that they also apply to the states on the right hand side. When
from the context it is clear what types of parity state we are dealing with, we refrain from writing the
subscript 2 or 3 on 0 or 1. For example it is clear that a state |0〉A,B,C is a |03〉 state and a state like
|0〉1,2 is a |02〉 state.
A CNOT operation with control bit X (where X ∈ {A,B,C}) and target bit 1 is denoted by CX1.
Simple calculation shows that on this encoded states [20], we have the following CNOT operations,
Fig. (1)
(CX,1 or CX,2) |q〉X |q′〉1,2 = |q〉X |q+ q′〉1,2, (4)
and
CX,1CY,2|q〉X,Y |q′〉1,2 = |q〉X,Y |q+ q′〉12. (5)
Note the difference: In Eq. (4) only one of the CNOTs should be applied, while in Eq. (5) both
CNOT’s should be applied. Finally we numerate the rounds as 0, 1, 2, · · · The superscript (0),(1) ,(2) , · · ·
are used to denote the form of the carrier at the start of rounds 0, 1., 2, · · · .
2.2 The QSS scheme in the absence of noise
The three party secret sharing scheme [20], which can easily be extended to N−party scheme runs as
follows Alice, Bob and Charlie (A,B and C) share a GHZ state
|GHZ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), (6)
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: The CNOT operators on encoded states, (a): equation (4), (b): equation (5).
which upon the joint Hadamard action of all three parties HA ⊗HB ⊗HC turns into another carrier
|0〉ABC = 1
2
(|000〉+ |110〉+ |101〉+ |011〉) , (7)
Since H2 = I , we have
H⊗3|0〉 = |GHZ〉, H⊗3|GHZ〉 = |0〉. (8)
Therefore the two types of carriers alternate in even and odd rounds (starting from round 0 with GHZ).
Consider now the even rounds 0, 2, 4, · · · , where the carrier is |GHZ〉
ABC
and Alice encodes |q〉 to
|q, q〉1,2 and entangles this state to the carrier by the operation CA,1 ⊗ CA,2. The total state becomes
|Ψeven〉ABC,1,2 = |000〉|q, q〉+ |111〉|q, q〉. (9)
At the other end, Bob and Charlie disentangle the state |qq〉 by operationsCB,1 andCC,2, returning the
carrier to the |GHZ〉 state, and read the message bit q independently. In these rounds, the sequence
of operations can be collected in the form
Ωeven = CC,2CB,1CA,2CA,1. (10)
At the end of even rounds, all three parties act by their Hadamard operation on their share and turn the
carrier to the state |0〉
ABC
. In the odd rounds 1, 3, 5, · · · , where the carrier is |0〉
ABC
= |0〉
A
|0〉
BC
+
|1〉
A
|1〉
BC
, Alice encodes the state |q〉 to |q〉1,2 and entangles this state to the carrier by her operation
CA1 on only one of the qubits (see Eq.(4)). This changes the total state to
|Ψodd〉 = |0〉A|0〉BC |q〉1,2 + |1〉A|1〉BC |q〉1,2. (11)
Again the state in travel is a mixture of |q〉 and |q〉 and is hidden from any adversary. At the des-
tination, Bob and Charlie perform the operation CB,1CC,2 to disentangle the state from the carrier
(download it) (see (Eq. 5)). In these rounds, the sequence of operations can be collected in the form
Ωodd = CC,2CB,1CA,1. (12)
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a: Rounds  0, 2, 4,…
b: Rounds 1, 3, 5, …
|0i
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Figure 2: In even rounds 0, 2, 4, · · · , the carrier is |GHZ〉 and q is encoded into a product state |q, q〉.
In odd rounds 1, 3, 5, · · · the carrier is H⊗3|GHZ〉 = |0〉 and q is encoded into an entangled state
|q〉1,2. In the even rounds, where Bob and Charlei can retrieve the bit independently, Alice can send
redundant bits which carry no information.
But this time the state can be decoded only if Charlie and Bob collaborate with each other (i.e.
Acting by C12 on the received state). It has already been shown in [20] that Eve cannot entangle her-
self with the carrier state, since the joint Hadamard operation effectively throws her out by revealing
her presence to the legitimate parties.
Remark: Note that since any basis state |q〉1,2 can be sent by Alice and retrieved by the receivers,
it is obvious by linearity of the process that any linear combination of these basis states, i.e. any un-
known quantum state |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + —
¯
1〉 can also be encoded into |ψ〉 = α|0, 0〉 + —
¯
1, 1〉 in even
rounds and |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ —
¯
1〉 in odd rounds. Note that the even rounds is not used for sharing data
between Bob and Charlie and in fact Alice can spare these rounds and send sensitive data only in odd
rounds where the receivers should collaborate to retrieve the data. The answer to the question why
the parties do not always use the odd-type carrier is that the Hadamard operations are necessary for
the security of the protocol [20] and the action of these Hadamard operations inevitably changes the
carrier in alternate rounds.
We are now ready to study the robustness of this scheme first under de-phasing and then under
global depolarizing noise.
5
3 Effect of de-phasing noise
A ubiquitous form of noise is de-phasing which maps the carrier state |GHZ〉 into the following
ρ(even) = (1− 2p)|GHZ〉〈GHZ|+ p|000〉〈000|+ p|111〉〈111|. (13)
Such a state is the result of random phase kicks on the three qubits. In fact the random operation of a
product operator
U = eiθ1σz ⊗ eiθ2σz ⊗ eiθ3σz
in the form ∫
dU U |GHZ〉〈GHZ|U†, (14)
where dU = P (θ1, θ2, θ3)dθ1dθ2dθ3, produces the state in (13) with the following parameter p
p =
1
2
[
1−
∫
dθ1dθ2dθ3e
2i(θ1+θ2+θ3)P (θ1, θ2, θ3)
]
. (15)
Here we have used the plausible assumption that the probability distribution function is an even func-
tion of its arguments, that is, the phase kicks are symmetric around zero.
As we will see in the sequel, it is convenient if we define another GHZ state in the form
|GHZ ′〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉). (16)
We can then rewrite the noisy state ρ(0) in the form
ρ(even) = (1− p)|GHZ〉〈GHZ|+ p|GHZ ′〉〈GHZ ′|. (17)
The main concern is that, with the operations of the three parties (i.e. the uploading, downloading
and Hadamard operations), the shape of the carrier may continually changes in each round and be-
comes useless for transmission of states after a few rounds. However as we will show in the sequel,
this is not the case. To see this we first note from (9) and (17) that in even rounds both carriers |GHZ〉
and |GHZ ′〉 are equally effective in delivering a state |q, q〉 from A to B and C in safe form. Thus, in
the even rounds de-phasing noise has no detrimental effect on the scheme. At the end of these rounds,
the state is acted upon by the Hadamard operations HA ⊗HB ⊗HC and turns into
ρ(odd) = (1− p)|0〉〈0|ABC + p|1〉〈1|ABC . (18)
To analyze the performance of this carrier, we need only study the carrier |1〉ABC and then com-
bine the results, since we already know that the carrier |0〉ABC delivers the state |q〉 in safe form. In
odd rounds, the operations of the players is given by Ωodd = C
C,2
C
B,1
C
A,1
. This operation is shown
in circuit diagram of Fig. (6). We have to affect this operator on
|1〉
ABC
|q〉
1,2
≡ XAXBXC |0〉ABC |q〉1,2. (19)
To affect this, we note from Fig. (6) that
ΩoddX
A
X
B
X
C
= X2XAXBXCΩ
odd
which in combination with (19) and the fact that X2|q〉 = |q〉, shows that in odd rounds
|1〉
ABC
|q〉
1,2
−→ |1〉
ABC
|q〉
1,2
. (20)
6
This means that in even rounds the message state being encoded as |qq〉 is delivered in safe form
and in odd rounds the message state encoded as |q〉 is delivered with probability (1−p) in safe form as
|q〉 and with error probability equal to p as |q〉. The important point is that the sequence of operations
do not change the carriers anymore except the Hadamard operations at the end of each round which
turn the carriers into each other, Fig (3). At the end of this round the carrier will be in the state (18)
and after the Hadamard operation again turns into (17) or equivalently (13) and will be ready for the
next round.
Since this protocol is linear, it can be used for quantum state sharing. A quantum state like
|φ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉 can be encoded as |φ˜〉 = a|0, 0〉+ b|1, 1〉 in even rounds and as |φ˜〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉
in odd rounds and communicated to the receivers who retrieve it in the original form with some error.
As mentioned before, only odd rounds are used for sharing states, and the retrieved state is given by
ρφ = (1− p)|φ〉〈φ|+ pX|φ〉〈φ|X . The average fidelity is given by
Fav =
1
4pi
∫
〈φ|ρφ|φ〉 = 1− 2p
3
. (21)
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a: Even rounds
Figure 3: In even rounds, where q is encoded into a product state |q, q〉 the carrier |GHZ〉
ABC
is
contaminated by |GHZ ′〉
ABC
which acts as good as |GHZ〉
ABC
. In odd rounds where q is encoded
into an entangled state |q〉, the carrier |0〉
ABC
is contaminated by |1〉
ABC
which flips the state to |q〉.
The two kinds of carriers turn into each other after each round.
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4 Effect of depolarizing noise
We now consider another important type of noise, namely a global depolarizing noise which affects
the carrier as follows:
ρ(even)
ABC
= (1− p)|G0〉〈G0|+ p
8
I, (22)
where for simplicity of notation, we have denoted the standard GHZ state, simply as G0. The full set
of GHZ states which form a basis for the space of three qubits are:
|G0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), |G′0〉 =
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉),
|GA〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |011〉), |G′A〉 =
1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉),
|GB〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉), |G′B〉 =
1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉),
|GC〉 = 1√
2
(|001〉+ |110〉), |G′C〉 =
1√
2
(|001〉 − |110〉). (23)
These states form an ortho-normal basis, and have the following relations with each other
|Gi〉 = Xi|G0〉, |G′i〉 = Xi|G′0〉, (24)
where i = 0, A,B,C and X0 = I . And they are complete
I =
∑
i=0,A,B,C
|Gi〉〈Gi|+ |G′i〉〈G′i|. (25)
In order to see how the protocol runs in this case, we have to decompose the carrier in terms of the
above collection of GHZ states
ρ(even) = (1− p)|G0〉〈G0|+ p
8
[∑
i
|Gi〉〈Gi|+ |G′i〉〈G′i|
]
. (26)
Using Eq. (24), the relations H⊗3|G0〉 = |0〉 and ZH = HX , we also find
H⊗3|Gi〉 = Zi|0〉, H⊗3|G′i〉 = Zi|1〉, (27)
where Z0 = I and the above relations are correct modulo a global ± sign.
Equipped with these relations we now investigate how the protocol runs if the carrier is not a pure
GHZ states but a mixture of different GHZ states in Eq. (23). As performed for the de-phasing noise,
we consider one of the GHZ states, run the protocol with this carrier and combine the results at the end.
Let the carrier be |Gi〉. The state to be shared is |q, q〉, and the full actions of the players is given by
Ωeven = C
C,2
C
B,1
C
A,2
C
A,1
, shown in the circuit diagram (5). Using the relationCi,jXi = XiXjCi,j
shown in Fig. (5), we find
Ω(even)X
A
= X
A
X1X2Ω
(even),
Ω(even)X
B
= X
B
X
1
Ω(even),
Ω(even)X
C
= X
C
X
2
Ω(even). (28)
Running the protocol on |Gi〉|q, q〉, using (28) and the above relations, we find
Ω(even)|Gi〉ABC |q, q〉1,2 = |Gi〉ABCX(i)|q, q〉1,2 , (29)
8
AC
B
A
C
B
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a: Even rounds
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Figure 4: Under a global depolarizing noise, the carrier alternates between the above two forms in
even and odd rounds.
where
X(0) = I , X(A) = X1X2 , X
(B) = X1 , X
(C) = X2. (30)
It is obvious that exactly the same relations hold when the carrier |Gi〉 is replaced with |G′i〉. Com-
bining all the relations we find that when the protocol is run on the noisy carrier (26), the result is:
ρ(even) ⊗ |q, q〉〈q, q| −→ (1− p)|G0〉〈G0| ⊗ |q, q〉〈q, q|
+
p
8
∑
i
[(|Gi〉〈Gi|+ |G′i〉〈G′i|)⊗X(i)|q, q〉〈q, q|X(i)]. (31)
Therefore with probability P = 1− p + p4 = 1 − 3p4 , the state |q, q〉 is transmitted in correct form.
With probability 3p4 it is transmitted in a form where one or both of the qubits have been flipped. Thus
the error probability for even rounds is equal to P (even)error = 3p4 .
Consider now the odd rounds. The carrier is now given by
ρ(odd) = (1− p)|0〉〈0|+ p
8
[ ∑
i=0,A,B,C
Zi
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)Zi], (32)
obtained by the Hadamard actions of the players on (26), Fig (4). Note that since H2 = I and
HZ = XH , the carriers in the even and odd rounds turn into each other by the Hadamard action of
9
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Figure 5: The operations of players in even rounds shown in circuit form. The top figure shows
encoding of the state |q〉 and the actions of A, B and C and the bottom figure shows the identity
(Ci,jXi = XiXjCi,j) which is used in deriving (28).
the players.
We now have to consider the carriers Zi|0〉 and Zi|1〉 separately and then combine the results. In
odd rounds, the operations of the players is given by Ωodd = C
C,2
C
B,1
C
A,1
. This operation is shown
in circuit diagram (6) where we use the relation ZiCi,j = Ci,jZi, Fig.(6), to find
ΩoddZi = ZiΩ
odd, (33)
from which we find
Ω(odd)Zi|0〉ABC |q〉1,2 = Zi|0〉ABC |q〉1,2 ,
Ω(odd)Zi|1〉ABC |q〉1,2 = Zi|1〉ABC |q〉1,2 . (34)
Combining these equations and using Eq. (32) we find
ρ(odd) ⊗ |q〉〈q| −→ (1− p)|0〉〈0| ⊗ |q〉〈q|
+
p
8
∑
i
[(
Zi|0〉〈0|Zi)⊗ |q〉〈q|
]
+
p
8
∑
i
[(
Zi|1〉〈1|Zi)⊗ |q〉〈q|
]
. (35)
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Figure 6: The operations of players in odd rounds shown in circuit form. The top figure shows
encoding of the state |q〉 and the actions of A, B and C and the bottom figure shows the identity
(Ci,jZi = ZiCi,j) which is used in deriving (33).
This means that in odd rounds, the states |q〉 is transmitted correctly with probability P = 1 −
p+ p2 = 1− p2 and in flipped form |q〉 with probability P odderror = p2 . When used for state transmission
(see the discussion above (21)), the fidelity is given by given by
Fav =
1
4pi
∫
〈φ|ρφ|φ〉 = 1− p
3
. (36)
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to study the theoretical possibility of using entangled states as
reusable carriers of information. Therefore our concern has not been practical or security issues of
protocols based on this idea. Rather we have studied the robustness of quantum state sharing protocol
with reusable entanglement against de-phasing and depolarizing noise. In this type of protocol, the
carrier which is a shared entangled state between the legitimate parties acts as a medium to which
message states are entangled and disentangled in the sender and receiver ends. During the transition
the state identity, being in a highly mixed state is hidden from adversaries. For security of the proto-
col, the carrier should alternate between two different types and it is crucial that these carriers are not
distorted and destroyed completely by noise and the repeated downloading and uploading operations
of the parties. We show that this is in fact the case and the carrier enters into a fixed 2-cycle each of
which delivers the state with some specific and fixed error. We have also shown that the errors in the
transmitted states are fixed and non-increasing in consecutive rounds. Since the scheme is used for
11
sending deterministic classical or quantum states, such errors can be completely controlled by using a
quantum error correcting code.
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